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Introduction 
Chinese foreign direct investment has grown exponentially in the past few years. 
According to Chinese Global Investment tracking, China has invested $198.09 Billion in the 
Arab Middle East and Northern Africa. By doing this, China has expanded their market in these 
regions, and secured access to importation of natural resources. Although these efforts have 
benefitted both parties financially, Chinese involvement seems to have contradicted China’s 
traditional policy of non-interference regarding another country’s internal affairs. Another way 
China has stepped back from its noninterference policies is through military intervention. This 
has typically been done through conventional arms sales to developing countries (Olson 
Lounsbery and Pearson, 2020). Chinese military operations have included contributing ground 
troops and naval support in peace-keeping operations, with over 27,000 military personal as of 
2016, and naval expeditions to fight piracy in the Gulf of Aden (Rinehart, 2016). With the 
Chinese military budget expanding 9.5% every year from 2005 to 2014 (Rinehart, 2016,) it is 
seen that the military capabilities for intervention has expanded for China and has reflected so in 
their actions. Economic and military intervention are not new in developing countries, but when 
discussing China and their policies, it is important to note the uniqueness of their involvement 
and responses when civil conflict arises. 
  While economic interventions typically assume to improve target states, unintended 
consequences can also emerge. Economic inequalities, human rights violations, and increased 
fighting have all been consequences of foreign involvement that will be discussed later on. 
Understanding the impact Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has on civil conflict and its 
intensity can allow us to understand whether these investments benefit or hurt developing 
countries overall. It is also important to understand what lengths states might go to in order to 
protect the investments made in a host country. If investments are threatened, situations may 
arise that require foreign military involvement by the investor country, which can create addition 
problems within the targeted country. Knowing these impacts can also formulate predictions on 
what is to come for other countries who receive Chinese investment. To test this, I examine 
relevant literature regarding conflict intensity, foreign direct investment, and history of Chinese 
economic and military intervention. From the relevant literature and data collected, we can 
expect a positive correlation between Chinese FDI and the presence and intensity of conflict, as 
well as subsequent efforts to maintain target state stability. 
Of course, China is not the only major power that pursues its national security and 
economic interests in the system. While China is not the only major power to do this, I expect 
that the impact of Chinese Intervention to be different from other major powers. Particularly for 
Western powers following the end of the Cold War, leaders such as the former President of the 
United States, George H. W. Bush has called for collective action of major powers under the idea 
of “New World Order” (Miller and Yetiv, 2001). This collective action idea calls for cooperation 
between states and international organizations for intervention to protect human rights and to 
promote stability and democracy for citizens facing suppression and violence by their respective 
government (Knudsen, 1996). This idea has continued throughout the post-Cold War period and 
has been the justification for intervention by Western powers such as the United States. Unlike 
these justifications, China has shown that with its policy of non-interference, the value for its 
economic assets outweighs the potential human rights violations that may result from their 
investments. By citing state-sovereignty for its reasons not to involve themselves in other states’ 
internal affairs, it can be argued the impact of Chinese intervention in a state can lead to a lack of 
checks and balances, resulting in detrimental consequences.  
  
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
  Previous research has attempted to explain the factors that facilitate civil conflict onset 
conflict intensification. Civil conflict factors have been categorized into three groups then broken 
down into subsections: individual analysis, state level factors, and international structure (Olson 
Lounsbery and Pearson, 2009). Individual analysis explains the reasoning for leaders, 
individuals, and groups to mobilize, or if thought necessary, take up arms against the 
government. In order for civil conflict to occur, a large portion of individuals must be able to 
share common problems and identify with the same group who believe they must change the 
system. State level factors for civil conflict include the geographic, economic, social, and 
political characteristics of the state (Olson Lounsbery and Pearson, 2009). Various research 
findings (Fearson and Laitin, 2003, Olson Lounsbery and Pearson, 2009; and Hegre and 
Sambanis 2006) point out that civil conflict is more likely to occur in countries with 
mountainous, rough terrains. Further, regions experiencing political instability, high political 
corruption, lack of resources and lack of infrastructure are prone to civil conflict (Stewart, 2002). 
It also appears that economic inequality may be a factor leading to war. Civil conflict 
intensity was found to significantly escalate due to economic inequality, stating that the poorer 
the countries were, the deadlier conflict was in that country (Chaudin and Peskowitz, 2017; Lu 
and Thies, 2011). Research has also shown that inequalities in a state have varying effects on 
different groups, and effects the willingness to engage in rebellion (Regan and Norton, 2005). 
Lack of income in a developing country may hinder its ability to ward off attacks from non-state 
actors, who can be motivated by economic grievances. Contradictory findings relating to 
economic equality being a factor to civil conflict argue that there was no relationship between 
poverty and probability of civil conflict (Langer, 2013). Foreign Direct Investment has the 
capability to alleviate these problems in developing countries. By alleviating poverty, conditions 
for civil conflict could be reduced. Yet, the research on FDI is rather complicated with opposing 
views on the impact of foreign direct investment. Some researchers (Ree and Nillesen, 2019; 
Djankov and Reynal‐Querol, 2010) found that FDI and aid had no statistical evidence on onset of 
civil conflict, while others (Mihalache-O'keef, 2018; Pinto and Zhu, 2011) found that specific 
forms of FDI regarding the primary sector (agriculture, fishing, forestry, mining, deposits) lead 
to an increased probability of civil conflict onset. This can be attributed to the fact that many 
developing countries are resource dependent, as their economy relies heavily on the exportation 
of natural resources. Therefore, as FDI from other actors continue to invest in the primary sector 
of the host country, reliance on natural resources increases, creating a dangerous cycle of 
economic inequality and stunting the growth of the host’s economy. Each of these studies 
examine the issue generally. It is suggested here that Chinese FDI requires a closer look, and 
may help to explain these contradictory findings on FDI. 
Chinese international diplomacy is a unique strategy with many inherent complexities. In 
a traditional non-interference model, China attempts to refrain from interfering with the 
sovereignty of other states. Unfortunately, as China expands its investments into developing 
regions, this policy has proven to be difficult to abide by. As the need for importing natural 
resources continues, the ability to remain out of other states’ internal affairs dwindles. China has 
invested heavily into the Middle East and African countries, primarily to export natural resources 
(Chaudoin et al, 2017; Yang, 2018). In order to protect its energy interests, China has invested 
billions in infrastructure to transport its exports (Chaudoin et al, 2017). With about half of its oil 
imports coming from the Middle East, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was forged to link 
China to the Middle East and Africa (Chaudoin et al, 2017; Mordechai, 2019). Eventually, due to 
the immense volume of its investments in these regions, China’s maintenance of its non-
interference foreign policy has become nonviable. The global power’s involvement in foreign 
affairs as a means of protecting its investments has consistently equated to involvement in these 
countries’ national security, especially in regards to protecting its citizens abroad. In the case of 
the Libya crisis in Africa in 2011, evacuations of Chinese citizens in the area and calls for 
mediation between the fighting parties were made (Obert, 2016). 
Chinese foreign direct investment may be potentially detrimental to developing countries, 
for a couple of reasons. By receiving large quantities of investment, countries can become 
heavily dependent on FDI. This reliance on FDI in primary sectors increases the probability of 
civil conflict onset in these regions, and anywhere China may invest in the future. As previously 
mentioned, primary sector investments tend to increase the probability of civil conflict onset; 
Chinese investments in primary sectors of a host’s economy can create economic inequality 
between different groups in the state. Because Chinese FDI is focused heavily on acquiring 
natural resources needed for domestic use, exploitation of developing countries could be a result 
of Chinese interests.  
If civil conflict begins to emerge, China’s non-interference policy is potentially 
problematic. China’s known opposition to international norms relating to human rights and 
democratic processes is relevant in this discussion. In the post-cold war era, intervention by 
foreign powers has taken on new characteristics such as an increase in peacekeeping, and 
policies that apply stabilization and reconstruction operations (Pang, 2008). With the UN 
creation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), member states have made a commitment to 
helping populations at risk of human rights violations. Like Western powers, China has accepted 
the idea of R2P, but has drawn to a different interpretation. With the foreign policy of non-
intervention, China has stressed the idea of not becoming involved in what they deem to be 
internal affairs. This can be seen through in multiple instances such as the conflict in Syria. With 
reports of human rights violations coming from the Assad regime on its on population, efforts to 
penalize the Syrian government and help those effected were blocked by China. Vetoes by China 
on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions (Drafted by France and the United 
States) concerning sanctions and referring Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
(Snetkov and Lanteigne, 2015), have shown that China’s foreign policies creates problems for 
humanitarian efforts. The same can be said of international efforts to address genocidal 
conditions in Darfur (discussed in more detail later). It appears evident that China is less 
concerned about human rights norms than other major Western powers, or at least finds 
international efforts to address such violations as unnecessary. Potential inequalities that exist in 
investment states could be potentially exacerbated by Chinese FDI. If conflicts were to arise 
from states dependent or close to China, it is possible we could witness detrimental human rights 
violations without a response. Because China is continuing to expand its wealth and influence 
around the world, its disregard for international norms poses a global security risk. 
Although literature pertaining to intervention and onset have produced mixed findings, 
the uniqueness of Chinese FDI and non-intervention policies have pushed for state sovereignty 
without the need to intervene in state internal affairs. By doing this, Chinese foreign policy has 
failed to address problems such as human rights violations which can prove to be detrimental and 
increase the probability of civil conflict. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H1: Chinese economic intervention increases civil conflict propensity. 
 Among those developing states where conflicts do exist, I also suspect that those disputes 
will be more intense with Chinese FDI presence. Because of Chinese history of non-interference 
and promotion of state sovereignty, target regimes may feel that intervention due to human rights 
violations will be less perused by China as compared to the willingness of western states to 
intervene. With less pressure placed on them by the Chinese government, I believe that conflict 
will be allowed to continue longer and therefore escalate with Chinese investment present, 
Therefore I theorize that:  
H2: Chinese economic intervention increases civil conflict intensity 
  
Foreign Military Intervention 
  
Foreign Military Intervention (FMI) is a foreign policy tool, among others, that states use 
in pursuit of foreign policy goals. Motivations for FMI are complex and typically 
multidimensional. Decisions to support external actors militarily may be a function of strategic, 
economic, and/or humanitarian goals (Pearson and Baumann, 1998). 
Global actors also use Foreign Military Intervention in an attempt to address challenges 
concerning civil conflicts. Like interstate conflicts, territory and proximity increase the likeliness 
of FMI in civil conflicts, along with ethnic and religious group kindred group presence (Peksen, 
2012). FMI in civil conflict by actors is also used when protecting minority groups in these 
countries. External actors intervening in civil wars have the capability to support the 
government, opposition force, or remain neutral. Providing FMI to a particular side is called 
directional intervention (Olson Lounsbery and Pearson, 2020). By doing this, it has been found 
that directional intervention increases the duration of a conflict and complicates the ability to 
achieve peace (Olson Lounsbery and Pearson, 2020). Intervention in support of the government 
has been found to not increase the probability of a government victory, unless rebels have an 
advantage in military capability (Pickering and Mitchell, 2017). But FMI in support of rebels has 
been found to increase the likelihood of a rebel victory but decreases rebel’s willingness to 
engage in peace talks (Gent, 2008; Olson Lounsbery and Pearson, 2020). 
FMI in civil conflicts can have lasting consequences on the state. It has been found that 
use of FMI typically increases human rights abuses in the state (Peksen, 2012; Pickering and 
Mitchell, 2017). The use of FMI can also destabilize a region, resulting in violence spilling over 
borders and increase civil conflict in the region (Peksen and Olson Lounsbery, 2012). But the use 
of neutral intervention, commonly found in United Nations peacekeeping, has been found to 
decrease the effects of FMI, particularly directional intervention (Beardsley, 2011). UN 
peacekeeping has shown to have the ability to decrease the likeness of civil conflict reaching 
neighboring countries (Olson Lounsbery and Pearson, 2020). Understanding factors that 
contribute to FMI are important due to these dire consequences. 
Despite China’s relative reluctance to become entangled in the affairs of other states, it 
would seem evident that its economic endeavors may have implications for its ability to fully 
embrace a noninterventionist foreign policy. The use of FMI by the Chinese can be seen in the 
cases of the conflict in Darfur and Myanmar. In Sudan, China has supplied arms to the Sudanese 
government since the 1960s, and continued this practice through the 2000s (David, 2009). These 
armament sales included aircrafts, tanks, vehicles, and small arms (David, 2009). These weapons 
were found to be used in Darfur, which went against a UN embargo of arms sales, arguably 
contributing to the human violations conducted in Darfur. With the attack on oil companies, 
speculated to be around $5 billion, and Chinese citizens in this region, Chinese interests were 
placed at risk (David, 2009). Using its influence in this region, agreements by South Sudan and 
China were made in order to protect its investments (David, 2009). In Myanmar, China had a 
trade surplus of around $3.7 billion, with plans of constructing both natural gas and crude oil 
pipelines (Enze, 2017). China has had a history of arm sales in the country with an agreement in 
1994 of $400 million worth of tanks, plans, and small arms (Bert, 2004). As conflict has 
continued in Myanmar, along with Myanmar becoming more involved with the West, Myanmar 
forces have attacked ethnic militarized groups near the Chinese border. Speculation of arms sale 
to ethnic Chinese groups, such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), have been made due to 
discoveries of these groups being armed with weapons that were made in China (Chaudhury, 
2020). Because of these clashes near the border, along with instances of bombs landing in 
Chinese territory, China has used its influence in the country to call upon the Myanmar 
government to protect its interests, and an official apology for the bombings (Enze, 2017). In 
both cases, Chinese intervention was largely motivated by its need to protect its economic 
interests. The escalation of conflict in Darfur and the calls for direct military intervention by 
other major powers threatened Chinese investment in Sudanese oil (Barber, 2020). In Myanmar, 
China invested heavily in the Myitsom Dam in the northern Kachin State only to find that project 
under fire when the KIA renewed its insurgency against the Myanmar military. 
It is argued here that Chinese Military intervention is unique compared to intervention by 
Western powers following the end of the Cold war era. While China has participated in the sales 
of arms that have been used in conflict, China ultimately wants to secure its investments in 
foreign countries. With the influence it has, China will push to ensure that conflict should not 
disrupt its economic assets. As a result, the following hypothesis is presented for testing:  
H3: Foreign military intervention is more likely in developing countries where there is also 
Chinese economic investment. 
Methodology  
To advance the research on Chinese economic and military intervention, and to test the 
hypotheses presented above, multiple data sets were identified and will be employed. The 
population of interest is developing countries. Descriptive statistics will be done for all variables 
in the tests, located in the appendix. As countries are developing internally, it is important to 
know possible effects interventions made by foreign states, specifically China, have on the 
stability of this State. In order to determine what is a developing country, I will use the model of 
Pickering and Kisangani (2006) of defining developing countries as states with an annual Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of 50% or lower of the highest GDP per capita in the 
international system. Due to the lack of data concerning flows of FDI, the time frame of analysis 
of hypothesis 1 and 2 will cover the time period of 2000-2012. With the UCDP external dataset 
examining up to 2009, hypothesis 3 will include all developing countries for the time period of 
2000-2009.  
The first two hypotheses suggest that civil conflict propensity and intensity are a function 
of Chinese economic intervention. Both outcome variables for Hypothesis 1 and 2 are identified 
and defined using the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Data (Petterson and Öberg, 2020). Conflict 
Propensity is defined as “The presence of intrastate armed conflict in a given area, with an 
armed conflict being a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory over 
which the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a 
state, has resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (Petterson and Öberg, 
2020 p. 3). Intrastate conflicts involve armed conflict between a recognized member of the 
nation-state system and a non-state actor emerging from within its borders. Conflict propensity is 
given a value based on if there is armed conflict (1) and if there is not (0). Conflict Intensity is 
measured by the number of battle-related deaths occurring in a given year. Because of the 
challenge of identifying the exact number of deaths as a result of civil conflict, for each conflict 
identified by the Armed Conflict Dataset (Petterson and Öberg, 2020) provide three battle death 
estimates: Best, Low, and High (Petterson and Öberg, 2020). The best estimate will be used in all 
analyses using this variable. 
The third hypothesis predicts the occurrence of Military Intervention when Chinese 
economic investment is supplied to the State. To define this, the UCDP External Support data 
will be used. Foreign Military Intervention is support to a primary party in an ongoing conflict 
in a variety of forms including material/weapons, provision of sanctuary, financial assistance, 
logistics, and military support of troops (Stina, Pettersson and Themnér, 2011). This dependent 
variable, coded in any given year, has two values: if there is support (1) and if there was not 
support (0). The dependent variable will be broken down into two parts: FMI broad, which will 
consist of all forms of intervention mentioned above, and FMI narrow, which will only consist of 
troops, weapons, and money. 
By combining data used by the International Trade Centre (ITC) and OECD we can see if 
economic investment was sent by China to a developing country. These datasets list the amount 
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) given to each state in the international system by a state. 
Using these data sources, Economic Investment is measured as the presence (dichotomous 
variables) of FDI supplied to a developing country in a given year (ITC and OECD, 2020). In 
order to present China from acting outside of the international norm, Chinese FDI will be 
compared to western major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. 
These major powers FDI will be combined to into one variable, indicted as Western FDI, and 
China will stand alone as Chinese FDI.  Foreign Direct Investment will be defined as Economic 
intervention which is measured by whether FDI was supplied to a developing country (1) or not 
(0) (ITC and OECD, 2020). 
To address any spurious relationships for the first and second hypotheses predicting 
conflict presence and intensity, region of the target state and the regime type, specifically 
anocracy, will serve as control variables. Using the Correlates of War Country Codes Dataset, 
Region is coded for each developing country, which include Western Hemisphere, Europe, 
Africa, Middle East, Asia, and Oceania. It is important to note that conflicts generally occur 
more often in certain regions such as Africa and Asia, over other regions. (Gleditsch, et al. 
2002). Therefore, Africa and Asia will be included as dummy variables. Regime Type is the 
system of government use by a country and measured with scores from -10 to 10 from the Polity 
IV data set. Specifically, scores from -6 to 6, or anocracies, will be used as a control variable 
(Marshall and Gurr, 2020). Previous research has found that states considered as anocracies were 
more likely to experience civil conflict (Hegre, Ellingsen, et al. 2001). Therefore, it is important 
to address semi-democratic countries to prevent spurious relationships in the findings. 
When looking at the third hypothesis, the regions of Africa and Asia, and conflict 
propensity, will be used as control variables to eliminate potential spuriousness when predicting 
foreign military intervention. 
Prior to testing the hypotheses, descriptive statistics will be presented for each of the 
variables included in the study. Hypotheses will be tested in multivariate models using ordinary 
least squared (when predicting conflict intensity) and logistic regression (when predicting 
conflict presence and FMI), clustering on the country with robust standard errors. 
Autocorrelation in the models will be addressed using lagged dependent variables due to the time 
series nature of the dataset.  
  
Findings 
In Table 1 found below are the findings from the logistic regression testing H1 and 
ordinary least squared regression testing H2. For H1, two models were estimated. The bivariate 
analysis presented in Model 1 shows that Chinese foreign direct investment is a statistically 
significant predictor of civil conflict occurrence. In the second model, the controls of Africa, 
Asia, and anocracy were added. The finding is robust with these controls, which supports the 
first hypothesis. The control variable, Asia, had statistical significance in the first hypothesis, 
meaning that developing countries in Asia are more likely to experience conflict with Chinese 
FDI presence. Baseline predictions were shown that conflict occurrence in developing countries 
is 16.9%, and with the presence of Chinese intervention, the probability of conflict occurring in 
developing countries is increased an additional 4.6%. Asia, as a control variable, shows that the 
probability of conflict occurring is again raised another 5% (see Table 3 in the Appendix).  
Table 1 presents models 3 and 4 which include the results from the ordinary least squared 
regressions testing my expectations for H2. Model 3 included the dependent variable of Chinese 
FDI and lagged battle deaths. In model 4, the control variables were incorporated into the model. 
These results produced no significance; therefore, findings do not support hypothesis 2. This 
suggests that although Chinese economic intervention is associated with the presence of conflict 
in developing countries, it does not account for the intensity of said conflict at least for those 
states experiencing conflict. 
Table 1.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
              Propensity     Propensity         Intensity         Intensity    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
main                                                                         
Chinese FDI       0.755**        0.837**         62.28              141.6    
                  (2.95)         (2.67)          (0.49)             (1.20)    
 
Western FDI    -0.00719         0.0704           163.9             -47.57    
                 (-0.03)         (0.26)          (0.81)            (-0.23)    
 
Lagged Propensity        4.921***       4.564***                                 
                 (11.72)         (9.74)                                    
 
Africa                           0.327                             -261.2    
                                 (0.99)                            (-0.68)    
 
Asia                             0.827*                             321.3    
                                 (2.10)                             (1.66)    
 
Anocracy                         0.104                              161.0    
                                 (0.37)                             (0.38)    
 
Lagged intensity                                         0.968***          0.940*** 
                                                  (9.68)            (4.90)    
 
_cons            -3.922***      -4.186***        -91.65            -63.42    
                (-11.43)        (-9.59)          (-0.38)           (-0.18)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                  1419             922             174             128    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Lastly, Models 5-8 tested H3, with Foreign Military Intervention measured as both broad 
and narrow intervention. Models 5 and 7 were bivariate analyses, and the later models for each 
incorporated the control variables. None of the FDI variables reached statistical significance. 
Therefore, between the years of 2000-2009, it cannot be concluded that Chinese FDI had any 
impact on FMI in developing countries. The control variable Propensity of the conflict however, 
had statistical significance on the presence of FMI in developing countries. 
Table 2. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                    FMI (broad)     FMI (broad)    FMI (narrow)    FMI (narrow)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
main                                                                         
Chinese FDI        -0.486          -0.500          -0.576          -0.632    
                   (-1.23)         (-1.26)         (-1.65)         (-1.75)    
 
Western FDI        -0.289          -0.403          -0.511          -0.794    
                   (-0.58)         (-0.79)         (-1.09)         (-1.88)    
 
Propensity          8.408***        8.629***        7.920***        8.319*** 
                    (8.47)          (8.96)          (8.10)          (8.67)    
 
Africa                             -0.656                          -1.247    
                                   (-0.76)                         (-1.62)    
 
Asia                               -0.439                          -0.353    
                                   (-0.50)                         (-0.47)    
 
_cons               -6.502***       -6.184***       -6.309***       -5.789*** 
                    (-5.72)         (-4.98)         (-5.60)         (-4.98)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                    1161            1161            1161            1161    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
For all models in the research, it can be seen that the number of observations (N,) fluctuates 
between tests. This is attributed to a few factors. First, the inclusion of lagged dependent 
variables produces less observations in the data in order to prevent autocorrelation in the models. 
Secondly, specifically for H2, not all countries in the data set experienced conflict in all years 
observed, therefore the amount of observations for H2 are lower than the total amount of 
observations in the dataset. 
Conclusion 
  When interpreting the results of the study, it is important to discuss the restraints and 
scope of the research. Data concerning foreign direct investment and specific amounts given by 
countries can be difficult to come by, specifically for China. Because of this, a very limited time 
period could be observed as data was not readily accessible. Although the timeline of the 
research was not as long as I intended it to be, the discovery through testing was still significant. 
With these results, one can make realistic and educated inferences about the future of major 
power’s investments. But extensive future research must be conducted in order to come to 
conclusions. It is my hope that in the future, myself, or other researchers, can have access in 
order to further this study.  
With China’s non-interference policies combined with its history of not acknowledging 
human rights violations, it can be concluded that receiving economic investment from this major 
power could prove to be detrimental to a developing country. Specifically, could contribute to 
the presence of conflict. While China has made progress in changing its noninterference policy, 
such as supplying peacekeepers in areas such as Sudan, it is almost impossible to not question 
the real motivation for this action. With Chinese investments continuing in developing regions, 
Chinese influence expands and could prove to be another factor that maintains instability in 
developing areas, which will continue to be a major problem within the international system. 
When compared to major western powers, results have found that the presence of Chinese FDI 
increases the chance of conflict propensity. While it can be argued that 4.6% increase in the 
prediction of conflict occurrence is relatively low, one must note that China has investments in a 
large amount of developing countries. Because of this, major powers, and the international 
system, must hold themselves accountable when it comes giving FDI to developing countries. 
Investments into developing countries should not only benefit those who give it, but it should 
also benefit the countries that receive it, rather than being detrimental. It is important for other 
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Table 3. Hypothesis 1 
 
             |    Change    p-value  
-------------+---------------------- 
Chinese FDI  |                       
      1 vs 0 |     0.046      0.008  
Western FDI  |                       
      1 vs 0 |     0.004      0.796  
Intensity,lag|                       
      1 vs 0 |     0.714      0.000  
Africa       |                       
      1 vs 0 |     0.018      0.344  
Asia         |                       
      1 vs 0 |     0.050      0.087  
Anocracy     |                       




             |         0          1  
-------------+---------------------- 
  Pr(y|base) |     0.831      0.169 
 
    
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Variable   |     Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
 Chinese FDI|   1,548     .494186      .5001278      0          1 
Western FDI |   1,548    .7745478      .4180148      0          1 
FMI (broad) |   1,161     .118863      .3237668      0          1 
FMI (narrow)|   1,161    .1042205       .305678      0          1 
       Asia |   1,548    .2170543      .4123731      0          1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
     Africa |   1,548    .3023256      .4594139      0          1 
   Anocracy |   1,024    .3320313      .4711723      0          1 
  Intensity |     229    921.0655      1600.324     25      10165 
 Propensity |   1,548    .1479328      .3551481      0          1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
LagIntensity|  212       914.9104      1583.042     25      10165 
 
 
